"WE LIVE'S IN A FREE HOUSE SUCH AS IT IS":*
CLASS AND THE CREATION OF MODERN CML RIGHTS
RISA L. GOLUBOFF

INTRODUCTION

The shift during the 1940s from American public concern with
class to concern with race has become a commonplace in American
historiography. Alan Brinkley has written that World War II
was a significant moment in the shift of American liberalism from a preoccupation with "reform" (with a set of essentially class-based issues centered around confronting the problem of monopoly and economic disorder) and toward a preoccupation with "rights" (a commitment to the
liberties and entitlements of individuals and thus to the liberation of oppressed people and groups).

Gary Gerstle has come to a similar conclusion, observing a "seismic" shift in which liberals "committed [themselves] to civil rights...
[and] concerns with class division and the ill effects of capitalist civilization ...lost their primacy" on "the liberal agenda."' Brinkley and
Gerstle seem to assume at least a historical and perhaps even a natural
correlation between government regulation and class on the one
hand, and between individual rights claims and race on the other.
Even as they acknowledge that class issues "did not disappear from the

. Letter from Robert Hammond, Recording Secretary, Wando,
S.C., to NAACP
(Apr. 26,1947) (on file with NAACP Papers, Library of Congress, Wash., D.C. (NAACP
Papers), Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
Research Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law; B.A., Harvard
University; M.A., Princeton University;J.D., Yale Law School. The author would like to
thank Ariela Dubler, Myriam Gilles, Dirk Hartog, Dan Rodgers, and Rich Schragger.
All sources from the NAACP Papers are on file with the author.
I ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION
AND
WAR 170 (First Vintage Books ed. 1996) (1995).
Gary Gerstle, Protean Character of American Liberalism, 99 AM. HIST. REV. 1043,
1070 (1994) [hereinafter Gerstle, Protean Character]; see also GARY GERSTLE, AMERICAN
CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 240 (2001) [hereinafter
GERSTLE, RACE AND NATION] (observing that, during the Cold War, "the civic and racial traditions on which the nation's vigor had long depended were undergoing complex change").
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liberal agenda,, 3 they nonetheless describe them as separate from,
and contrasted with, the modern thing called "civil rights" that was
created in the 1940s.4
But there is neither a natural correlation between race and rights
nor a historical one. While I agree with Brinkley and Gerstle that racial concerns became more prominent in the 1940s than they had
been before, I do not agree that the concept of "civil rights" encompassed race to the exclusion of class. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, there was no settled category called civil rights in the 1940s;
rather, there were many lay people, lawyers, and institutions searching
for "rights" to formulate and constitutionalize.' The federal government, for example, was struggling to find a place in rights creation
and enforcement. 6 And the NAACP's new Legal Defense and Education Fund (Inc. Fund)7 was only beginning to contemplate the attack
on Plessy v. Ferguson8 that would eventually lead to Brown v. Board of
Education.9 Frameworks, strategies, and outcomes remained uncertain.
The individual rights assertions one finds trapped in the NAACP's
voluminous archives-particularly in the labor-related claims of
southern agricultural workers-show how varied conceptions of civil
rights were during the 1940s. More specifically, they show voices actively pushing the Inc. Fund toward economics and class issues. Dur-

Gerstle, Protean Character,supra note 2, at 1070.
' See also Peter J. Kellogg, Civil Rights Consciousness in the 1940s, 42 HISTORIAN 18,
36 (1979) (arguing that, after World War II, public and political attention became attuned to three main considerations, namely (1) moral qualms involving democratic
principles violated by racism, (2) a fear of violence, and (3) political competition for a
growing African American vote, all of which "seemed to come together in 1948 to
make civil rights appear to be the main issue of American domestic politics").
Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of
Civil Rights, 50
DuKE L.J. 1609, 1611-12, 1629-34 (2001).
6 See id. at 1618 (discussing the Department
ofJustice Civil Rights Section's original focus on labor issues and subsequent shift to "attack[ing] racial inequalities and
harms").
7 In 1939, the NAACP separated out its legal activities into the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, commonly called the Inc. Fund, although the relationship
between the Inc. Fund and the NAACP remained considerably intertwined until 1956.
See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAw 27, 310 (1994) (explaining the tax
reasons for the initial creation of the separate Inc. Fund in name in 1939, and its separation in practice in 1956). 1 use either "Inc. Fund" or "legal department" when referring exclusively to legal actions and decisions, and "NAACP" when referring to the organization as a whole.
8 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3
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ing this decade of confusion and experimentation, then, the assertion
of African American rights did not always take the now familiar form
of equal-protection-based antidiscrimination claims divorced from
class. What did take that form were the rights claims that the most vocal and successful black lawyers-those in the Inc. Fund-chose to
validate, pursue, and make doctrinally foundational. The NAACP
lawyers marginalized, cabined, and outright repudiated class issues
through the complaints they pursued and those they ignored. By the
1950s, when the antisegregation strategy that eventually led to Brown
coalesced, they had succeeded in writing class out of their story.
They succeeded in writing it out of our story as well. The correlation between the Inc. Fund's economically neutralized agenda and a
historiography that sees rights in the 194 0 s as noneconomic is no coincidence. Historians are wrong about the essential nature of individual rights because they have ignored the class-bound aspects of many
rights claims of the period. They have ignored these claims because
they have largely taken their history and their understanding about
civil rights from the NAACP's understanding and agenda. Equating
the kinds of rights the Inc. Fund sought to protect with the complete
set of rights African Americans sought to assert has thus led historians
astray.' O Whether individual rights in the 1940s can accurately be said
to include class as well as race concerns depends in large part on
whose rights one examines.
The project of this Article is to recapture the nascent rights claims
of southern agricultural workers largely overlooked by both the Inc.
Fund and the historiography. Recapturing these claims offers two lessons. First, their very existence at the intersection of race and class
undermines the historiography's description of a temporal shift from
one to the other. Similarly, these claims disrupt the historiography's
correlatives of economic regulation and race-based individual rights.
The complaints of African American southern agricultural workers
fracture the simple dichotomies-both temporal and conceptualthat we have come to accept." The second lesson stems not from the
10Recently, historians like Tomiko Brown-Nagin have begun to explore the complicated relationships between the national office of the NAACP, the NAACP
branches, and particular African American communities involved in civil rights struggles. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Race as Identity Caricature: A Local Legal Histoy Lesson in the
Salience of IntraracialConflict, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (2003); see also Derrick A. Bell,Jr.,
Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation,
85 YALE L.J. 470, 515-16 (1976) ("[T]he suggestions in this article ... are controversial
only to the extent they suggest that some civil rights lawyers ... are making decisions,
setting priorities, and undertaking responsibilities that should be determined by their
clients and shaped by their community.").
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t we have come to accept." The second lesson stems not from the existence of these claims but from their disappearance. While the cases
the Inc. Fund chose to pursue, as well as the many doctrinal, political,
and institutional reasons for its decisions, extend beyond the scope of
this Article, the simple fact that choices were made forms the core of
my present argument.'" Until now, it has been impossible to see these
critical choices because historians have ignored the potential cases the
Inc. Fund left behind. Examining those cases illustrates the openness
that characterized the creation of civil rights in the 1940s.
I. COMPLAINTS FROM THE RACIALIZED POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE AGRICULTURAL SOUTH

Throughout the 1940s, letters from African American southern
agricultural workers streamed steadily into the NAACP's national office. Some came directly from the workers themselves, others from
branches that had gotten involved in individual cases, and still others
from outside organizations and individuals on behalf of the workers.
While it is difficult to construct a wholesale civil rights doctrine out of
the issues raised in these complaints (and that is not my project), it is
easy to see that the issues the agricultural workers raised, and the kind
of legal doctrines those issues might have inspired, looked very different from the issues the Inc. Fund pursued and the doctrine it created.
In particular, the stories that follow show the abundance of individual
assertions of rights far beyond the Inc. Fund's univalent definition of
"injustice because of race or color.""
The complaints I discuss below all arose within the particular racialized political economy of the agricultural South. With the possible
exception of a few successful African Americans who managed to acquire their own land, the position of black agricultural workers was
11 I do not suggest that African American southern agricultural
workers are the
only group whose complaints combined economic and racial issues, but the combination is especially visible in their complaints.
1 explore the reasons for the Inc. Fund's exclusion of agricultural cases
from its
litigation agenda in the 1940s in my dissertation, The Work of Civil Rights in the 1940s:
The Department of Justice, the NAACP, and African American Agricultural Labor
(forthcoming 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University) (on file
with author). While this Article suggests the doctrinal reasons for the Inc. Fund's decisions-based in the pursuit of univalent race claims rather than multivalent race and
class claims-the dissertation argues that the NAACP's changing political and institutional commitments during the 1940s converged with the development of that doctrinal goal.
1'. Procedure for Legal Defense and Voting Cases (June 1939) (on file
with
NAACP Papers, Part 15, Series A, Reel 1).
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generally one of extreme dependency, considerable isolation, and actual or virtual immobility. Wage workers, tied to no particular parcel
of land, were simultaneously more mobile and more vulnerable to
white control than other farmworkers. They also usually exercised the
least economic power and endured the poorest living conditions. As
tenant farmers, and especially as sharecroppers, 14 many African
Americans lived on the land of a (usually white) landowner, whom
they paid either with money presumably made from the crop (as was
the case for cash tenants), or with a share of the crop (as for other
types of tenants and sharecroppers). Because both types of renters
(but especially sharecroppers) rarely had the cash necessary to buy the
seeds, fertilizer, storage space, or tools they would need for the coming season, they often had to rely on their landlords (or other local
white landowners and merchants) to "furnish" 15 such things, usually at
an exorbitant rate to be repaid when the crop was harvested. Sharecroppers did so more often (and for more items) than tenants, and,
more in debt to their landlords, they found themselves subject to
greater supervision by them.' Black farmworkers of both the renting
and the wage-earning type thus largely lived within a closed economic
universe where what money they had was spent in plantation commissaries or in stores that took advantage of their lack of mobility and
choice.17

14 "Cropper farming is a Negro institution," wrote Arthur Raper in
1936. ARTHUR

FRANKLIN RAPER, PREFACE TO PEASANTRY: A TALE OF Two BLACK BELT COUNTIES 148-

49 (1936).

15 "Furnish" was the term used for the credit system by which the tenant or share-

cropper borrowed food, clothing, and supplies against the following year's crops. See,
e.g., DAVID EUGENE CONRAD, THE FORGOTTEN FARMERS:

THE STORY OF SHARE-

CROPPERS IN THE NEW DEAL 11 (1965) ("From the time the season began until the
crop was made, the tenant was likely to be completely dependent on the commissary
for 'furnish,' or food and clothing."); DONALD H. GRUBBS, CRY FROM THE COTTON:
THE SOUTHERN TENANT FARMERS' UNION AND THE NEW DEAL 9 (1971) ("The sharecropper's previous harvest earnings were supposed to last him until March, when he
could begin receiving supplies on credit, 'furnish.' The 'furnish' system gave the
worker another master ... ").
1t FrankJ. Welch describes these terms, and
the system as a whole, in some detail
in THE PLANTATION LAND TENURE SYSTEM IN MISSISSIPPI (1943).
17 Historians have written extensively on the contours of this racialized
political
economy. They have long debated the extent of African American mobility following
the Civil War and into the twentieth century. For the argument that the combination
of law and custom succeeded in curtailing almost all African American movement, see
PETE DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH, 1901-1969 ix (1972);
GERALD DAVID JAYNES, BRANCHES WITHOUT ROOTS:

CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
NOT FREE:

SOUTH,

GENESIS OF THE BLACK WORKING

1862-1882, at 254 (1986);JAY R. MANDLE, NOT SLAVE,

THE AFRICAN AMERICAN ECONOMIC EXPERIENCE SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 33
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State and local laws still on the books in the 1940s reinforced
these conditions of limited African American mobility. The roots of
many such laws went all the way back to the post-Civil War Black
Codes, though their overtly racial character had long been eliminated
by 1940.18 Hitchhiking laws, for example, curtailed mobility by eliminating a critical, free mode of transportation.'9 Emigrant agent licensing laws limited information flows by requiring labor recruiters to pay
often exorbitant amounts for the opportunity to recruit labor in
southern states. 0 Some states, like Virginia, required agents soliciting
on behalf of employers outside the state to pay $5000 per year for
each county or city in which they operated. 2' Alabama went even further, requiring the same amount not only for counties in which an
22
agent operated, but those through which he transported workers.
Similarly, "anti-enticement" laws, which southern states also kept on

(1992); DANIEL A. NOVAK, THE WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK FORCED LABOR AFTER
SLAVERY 2 (1978); Pete Daniel, The Metamorphosis of Slavery, 1865-1900, 66J. AM. HIST.
88, 89-90 (1979); Jonathan M. Wiener, Class Structure and Economic Development in the
American South, 1865-1955, 84 AM. HIST. REV. 970, 970 (1979). For the perspective of
those who find that, despite the law, African Americans moved freely throughout the
South, see ROBERT HIGGS, COMPETITION AND COERCION: BLACKS IN THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY, 1865-1914, at 26-27 (1977); Stephen J. DeCanio, Accumulation and Discrimination in the Postbellum South, in MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN
THE NEW SOUTH, 1865-1900, at 103, 105, 130-31 (Gary M. Walton &James F. Shepherd
eds., 1981) ;Joseph D. Reid, Jr., White Land, Black Labor and Agricultural Stagnation: The
Causes and Effects of Sharecroppingin the Postbellum South, in MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND
ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN THE NEW SOUTH,

1865-1900, supra, at 45.

For integrative

views, see ROGER L. RANSOM & RICHARD SUTCH, ONE KIND OF FREEDOM: THE
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EMANCIPATION 61-64, 193-97 (1977); William Cohen,
Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-1940: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 42 J. S. HIST.
31, 31 (1976). My point is less about the extent of mobility than about the ways in
which white southerners attempted to restrict it and the fact that African Americans
challenged these attempts by seeking help from the NAACP.
18NOVAK, supra note 17, at 1-8.
'9E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 2621 (99e) (1935); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-630 (1947).
20 See NOVAK, supra note 17, at 39 (describing enticement laws); Jennifer
Roback,

Southern Labor Law in the im Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive?, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
1161, 1169 (1984) (noting licensing fees of up to $5000 for each county in which recruiting took place).
21VA. CODE ANN. app. § 183 (Tax Code) (Michie 1942).
22ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 513 (1940); see also FLA. STAT. § 205.39 (1941) ($2000 for
the state); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7880(85) (1935) ($500 per county); S.C. CODE ANN. §
1378 (1942) ($2000 per county). See generally DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE
OF REDRESS:

AFRICAN AMERICANS,

LABOR REGULATIONS,

AND

THE COURTS

FROM

RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 12 (2001); Roback, supra note 20, at 1169 ("The
primary economic effect of the emigrant agent laws was to increase the cost to black
laborers of obtaining information about job opportunities outside their local market
area.").
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the books into the 1940s, made it a crime for an employer
to entice a
23
laborer away from his or her current employment.
Political repression accompanied economic exploitation. Most
black southerners, especially rural southerners, did not vote in the
1940s South, let alone hold public office. And, despite favorable longstanding constitutional precedent, 24 they did not sit on juries. They
did not serve as judges or police officers, and the latter often perpetrated violence against African Americans rather than protected them
from it. Political participation was so inaccessible to African Americans that many did not even read about elections, voting, or democracy in textbooks created specifically for black schoolchildren that
were legislatively mandated to exclude such topics. 5 Moreover, the
boards and committees that implemented and administered the various New Deal programs in agriculture, as well as wartime draft, wage,
and price boards, were dominated by whites with economic power
over black farmworkers. 26 At every level and branch of governance,
black agricultural workers were unrepresented. The virtual inaccessibility of governmental redress, whether by politics or law, regarding
property theft or personal violence, multiplied the pervasiveness of
21
economic dependence.

ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 332 (1940); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-210 (1947); FLA. STAT.
§
448.02 (1941); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 66-9904 to -9905 (1937); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 4469,
4470 (1935); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7030-10 (1942); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8559 (Michie
1938). See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 10.
24 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879)
(finding a West Virginia
statute banning African Americans from juries violative of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
25 TEXTBOOKS IN MISSISSIPPI, OPPORTUNITY, XVIII,
at 99 (Apr. 1940).
26 See HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS:
THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS AS A NATIONAL ISSUE 53 (1978) ("Not a single Negro served on an [Agricultural Adjustment Administration] county committee throughout the South."); Pete
Daniel, Going Among Strangers: Southern Reactions to World War II, 77 J. AM. HIST. 886,
891 (1990) (explaining that draft boards in Mississippi were "'made tip of planters"'
and that "[d]eferred workers ... 'do not feel free to leave the farm of the operator
who requested their deferment"' (quoting a 1943 Bureau of Agricultural Economics
stud))).
See CONRAD, supra note 15, at 205-06 (concluding that government agency
favoritism toward landowners exacerbated the plight of sharecroppers in the South);
GRUBBS, supra note 15, at 212-13 (explaining how landlords could manipulate the law
to swindle tenants out of their money); HAROLD D. WOODMAN, NEW SOUTH, NEW LAW:
THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CREDIT AND LABOR RELATIONS IN THE POSTBELLUM
AGRICULTURAL SOUTH 111 (1995) ("[T] he evolution of the legal changes in the South
after the Civil War seems clearly to be the result of a resurgent landowning class being
able to impose its will on helpless freedmen and a merchant class able to impose its
will on small landowners and tenants.").
23
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As a consequence, opportunities for planter control and intimidation were ubiquitous and frequently exploited. But the workers did
not accept the consequences silently. They complained, to the
NAACP among others. I have divided the complaints I found in the
NAACP Papers into three categories generally involving rights to
property and mobility. The first set includes a variety of complaints
about white landowners who managed either to acquire the property
of African American farmers or to prevent African Americans from
acquiring
elsewhere, through force, intimidation, and dis. •• property
28
crimination.
Often these incidents originated in landlord resentment at and retaliation against those African Americans who had
managed to secure some amount of independence or wealth. The
second set, which is comprised of a single case• with
widespread origins
.
29
and effects, concerns wages for cotton picking. Wage ceilings imposed during the war acted as a restraint on property-most specifically wages-and as a restraint on mobility indirectly. The third, and
most prominent and self-defining, set of southern agricultural complaints the NAACP saw in the 1940s involved direct restraints on per31
sonal mobility, in the form of involuntary servitude and peonage.
After discussing the complaints in each category and the NAACP's responses to those complaints, I conclude with a brief discussion of the
fundamental difference between these multivalent race/class rights
assertions and the univalent agenda the Inc. Fund ultimately pursued.''

See infra Part II (describing how landlords bound African American
renters to
the land on which they worked, thus limiting their opportunities for independence).
29 See infra Part III (arguing that wage ceilings
restrained the freedom of movement of laborers, to the benefit of their employers and landlords).
30 See infra Part IV (considering white employers' desire to obtain costless labor
28

through the elimination of worker mobility). It is important to note that these three
categories do not, of course, exhaust the kinds of issues that arose in the agricultural
South. I have omitted two significant topics in particular-the question of mechanization and the complicated approach the NAACP took to the importation of foreign
(especially Mexican) agricultural labor into the United States-as they involve not only
the issues African Americans faced in southern agriculture but also the movement of
African Americans out of agricultural work altogether.
See infra Part V (outlining the Inc. Fund's exclusive definition of race discrimination and the major types of cases in which the Inc. Fund became involved).
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II. "I HAVE A CASE HER I HAvE BEEN ROBE OUT OF MY LIVIN AND
RIGHTS":

32

INDEPENDENCE AND THE VULNERABILITY OF
BLACK SOUTHERN PROPERTY

African American tenant farmers and sharecroppers could rarely
afford the start-up costs of planting a crop. They often borrowed the
necessities from their landlords, and usually continued borrowing
throughout the year. They were often so far into debt by harvest time
that their share of the crop could not even cover the prior season's
debt, let alone provide enough capital to forgo debt for the following
season. The law-in the form of the crop lien laws most states continued to maintain into the 1940s-helped ensure that black agriculturalists would fail to see any profit from their crops. Crop lien laws
gave priority to landlords, and many gave second priority to others,
33
like merchants, who also lent supplies to tenants. These laws meant
that the loss from crops that failed to make a profit fell disproportionately on tenants. Sharecroppers, meanwhile, often had no legal rights
to the crops at all.34 By keeping prices for supplies high and farmworkers isolated from other options, landlords yoked African American renters to the land-and to harvesting the landlords' crops at
minimal cost to the landlords. 35 Independence, whether gained
through frugality, luck, wage work in winter, or government economic
programs, broke the yoke of debt and threatened the economic
dominance of the landlords.
When black farmworkers managed to gain some capital, they
sought what independence they could afford, which was usually limLetter from Charley Bright to Walter White (Jan. 20, 1945) (on file with NAACP
Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) [hereinafter Letter from Charley Bright].
33 E.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 83.10, 85.22 (1941); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 61-201 to -203 and
annotations (1937); see also GA. CODE ANN. §§ 67-110 to -1105 (1937). South Carolina,
North Carolina, Texas, and Mississippi gave first priority to landlords and second to
tenants. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8773 (Law. Co-op. 1942); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 2355 (1935);
TEX. LANDLORD & TENANT CODE ANN. § 5222 (Vernon 1947); MISS. CODE ANN. § 336
(1942).
34 Pete Daniel, The Legal Basis of Agrarian Capitalism: The South Since 1933, in RACE
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE 1890, at 79-102 (Melvyn Stokes & Rich Halpern eds., 1994).
35 SeeJOHN DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN 108-33 (1937) (describing how the relationship between the tenant farmer and the planter bears on the
issue of economic gain by the white middle class); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 235-50 (1944) (suggesting
that the southern plantation and tenure systems contributed to the obstacles African
Americans faced to becoming independent farm owners); NOVAK, supra note 17, at 4462 (stating that peonage plunged the freed slave into a new labor system that degraded
his value as a worker and made a mockery of his new economic freedom).
32
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ited to forgoing landlords' loans and "furnishing" themselves. In response and retaliation, landlords resorted to ever more direct means
of expropriating the fruits of the black farmers' labor. The landlords
would simply take what they had been unable to convince (or coerce)
the farmworkers to give up contractually-the profit from their crops.
The machinations were hardly opaque. One family, whose landlord
had ordered to vacate the farm so he could take their crops after they
had refused to borrow their share of fertilizer and seed from him,
concluded that the landowner "resented their foresight in managing
without his credit, and used this method to cheat them out of their
''
entire earnings. 31
The often successful efforts of these landlords led many black
farmers, or those acting on their behalf, to complain to the NAACP in
the hopes of retrieving their crops, their money, and their homes.
One branch member wrote to the legal office about a widow who
complained that her landlord confiscated her crops because her late
husband was allegedly indebted to him. The branch suggested that
[t]he case of Mrs. Bass is, we believe a deserving case and is typical of the
many cases in North Carolina and the south where the tenant, by devious means is robbed of his work inder the pretense of the law. It is our
belief that with proper legal defense this case and others could be fought
and the tenants would getjustice.3s

Mrs. Bass's case indeed seems typical. Not only did a report of the
National Sharecroppers' Fund reinforce the prevalence of such
claims, 9 but the NAACP Papers are filled with letters describing situations quite similar to the one facing Mrs. Bass. Major variations concerned the lengths to which landlords would go in depriving their
tenants and retaliating against them. The lucky ones, like Reverend
36 That small landowners and wage workers
are largely absent from these property
complaints makes considerable sense. Small landowners, although vulnerable to many
forms of discrimination and exploitation, were not dependent on white landowners in
the same way tenant farmers and sharecroppers were by virtue of the planters' land
ownership. Wage workers' opportunities for economic independence were slim, and
they were a threat to plantation owners only through controlling their own labor and
mobility, rather than their own property. Thus, wage workers complained far more
often about peonage and involuntary servitude.
37 Letter from Gudrun G. Rom to Walter
White (Jan. 10, 1946) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) [hereinafter Letter from Gudrun G. Rom].
38 Letter from Chas. G. Irving to Edward R.
Dudley (Oct. 29, 1944) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
39 Beth Biderman, The Condition of Farm
Workers in 1949: Report to the Board
of Directors of National Sharecroppers Fund, Inc. 4 (on file with NAACP Papers, Part
13, Series C, Reel 2).
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Valco Harris and Charley Bright, lost only their livelihoods. Harris
complained that while "cropping half," the landowner took Harris's
crops, refused to show him cotton gin receipts, and refused to pay him
for the crops. 40 He, along with his pregnant wife, their four children,
and three other families on the land, wanted to know, "Is it any laws to
fource Mr. George Chambers to give me my account and settle with
me?" 4' Bright similarly failed to see the money from his cotton crop.
He wrote,
"I have a case her I have been robe out of my Livin and
42
rights."
Lettie Franklin, who wrote concerning "my work and labor," suffered consequences similar to those facing other African Americans
who sought to communicate their plight: she ran the risk of losing
her home when the farmer on whose land she worked took her crop,
refused to furnish her or give her barn space, and wanted to throw
her out of her house." Those who did lose their homes, like the perceptive family aware of their landlord's resentment, fled to cities north
and south to try to find redress.44 Others even lost their lives, as it was
not unheard of for a cropper's success and his desire to dispose of his
own half of the crop to lead to his death .
To the structural imbalance of landlord and tenant, lender and
debtor, politically empowered and politically silenced, many landlords
added the absence of a written contract about the division of the
crops. A number of complaints identified the lack of a written contract as a problem. Mr. K.B. Brewer of the Charleston, Missouri,
branch wrote on behalf of an African American sharecropper named
Letter from Rev. Valco R. Harris to George S. Schulyer (Oct. 9, 1944) (on file
with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) [hereinafter Letter from Rev. Harris].
41 Id.
42 Letter from Charley Bright,
supra note 32.
43 Letter from Lettie Franklin to "sir" (Oct. 25,
1945) (on file with NAACP Papers,
Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
44 See Letter from Gudrun G. Rom, supra note 37 (reporting that Mr.
Simmons
fled from Magnolia, Mississippi, to Chicago with his family out of "fear for his life").
45 See Letter fromJ.T. Smith, Greensboro, Fla., to NAACP (Nov. 20,
1946) (on file
with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) (describing the "cane syrup murder"
committed by a farmer who was successful and debt-free, but who wanted the cropper's
share of the cane syrup nonetheless). Indeed, the NAACP tried to publicize the fact
that many lynchings stemmed not from rapes or alleged rapes, but from property disputes between white landowners and their black farmworkers. See WALTER WHITE,
ROPE & FAGGoT: A BIOGRAPHY OFJUDGE LYNCH 82 (1929) ("Lynching has always been
the means for protection, not of white women, but of profits." (emphasis omitted));
40

ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950, at 8-10

(1980) (examining economic and psychological causes of lynchings and mob mentality).
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Boyd, complaining that a local landlord had hired Mexican workers to
pick a crop that belonged to Boyd. "4 Brewer told the NAACP: "No
written contract or lease was given the Boyds. The agreement was
verbal., 47 Similarly, the Family Service Bureau of United Charities of
Chicago called the NAACP's attention to the fact that one family had
only "a verbal agreement" with their landlord.4 8 As Frank Welch, the
head of the department of agricultural economics at Mississippi State
University, put it in a study of the land tenure system in 1943, "nearly
all agreements are oral and informal," one result of which was to
make laborers vulnerable to "arbitrary and unfair treatment."49 The
verbal contract was often combined with a refusal to allow sharecroppers to examine a landlord's records, for example, which prevented
sharecroppers
from effectively contesting alleged, and often fraudu50
lent, debts.
Landlords and rural merchants did not limit their appropriations
of black labor and property to the crops themselves. They found ways
to deprive black farmers of whatever means the latter used to obtain
funds. One significant type of appropriation concerned checks various government agencies sent to agriculturalists through New Deal
programs that continued into the 1940s.' Sometimes the landowners
outright took the checks themselves. 2 At other times, their tactics
were (slightly) more subtle. Lulu White, an active and long-time
member of the Houston, Texas, branch of the NAACP informed the
national legal department of the problem near Houston: merchants
had "been securing from the Post Office[] the Government farm
checks and holding them and applying them to the accounts of the

Letter from K.B. Brewer to Thurgood Marshall (Dec. 8, 1948) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
47 Id.
48 Letter from Gudrun G. Rom,
supra note 37.
46

49 WELCH,

supra note 16, at 37.

Daniel, supra note 34.
See, e.g., Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Secretary of Agriculture (Feb.
14,
1940) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series A, Reel 1) (describing an incident in
which a farm tenant was forced to sign over a government check to his landlord).
52 See CONRAD, suln'a note 15, at 64-68 (illustrating incidents where
landlords took
money due tenants under New Deal programs); GRUBBS, supra note 15, at 30-61 (finding that sharecroppers were cheated and victimized by landlords tnder New Deal pro50

grams); PAUL E. MERTrZ, NEW DEAL POI.iCY AND SOUTHERN RURAL POVERTY

16-17

(1978) (reporting instances of "sheer fraud" on the part of planters and local authorities, such as landlords' practice of securing federal assistance checks directly "and
appl[ying] them to croppers' back debts, an action that was illegal").
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farmers without their consent.,,53 As a result, the farmers were forced
to spend their checks at the merchants' stores; the merchants thereby
transformed potentially independence-producing government funds
into further black dependence and white profit. Tampering with the
mail, Lulu White suggested, was a federal offense and she urged the
NAACP to pursue redress "
Other property deprivation schemes seemed to originate in the
government itself and the power that landlords exercised in the local
administration of federal government programs. Thus the national
office received numerous complaints about black farmers who were
having difficulty obtaining government loans on their crops."
Still
other complaints, like one from a group of 118 African American
families who were being sued for damaging property they had profitably leased as a cooperative under the Farm Security Administration
(FSA), were more idiosyncratic. 56 For the most part, the Inc. Fund
showed little interest in these property complaints. Occasionally, as
when the confrontation between planters and farm workers rose to
such a level of violence that death ensued, the NAACP would intervene. At that point, the case was no longer multivalent; murder rendered it amenable to more familiar frameworks. Those conflicts that
ended in the death of the landlord and the trial of the defendant
without proper safeguarding of his rights could lead the Inc. Fund to
fight to ensure the defendant received
due process during his (or,
• 57
more rarely, her) criminal proceedings. And those that ended with
the death of the African American could at times fall under the rubric
of lynching, a subject about which the NAACP had long crusaded.58
Even then, however, the extent of intervention was often limited to in-

Letter from Lulu B. White to Thurgood Marshall (Dec. 4, 1944) (on file with

53

NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).

Id,

5,4

Letter from Marian Wynn Perry to Hon. Clinton P. Anderson, Secretary of
Agriculture (July 2, 1947) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) [hereinafter Letter from Marian Wynn Perry].
56 Memorandum from Clarence Mitchell to
Thurgood Marshall (June 17, 1947)
(on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) [hereinafter Memorandum
from Mitchell to Marshall].
57 See The Inc. Fund, Semi-Annual
Report of the Legal Department, January 1June 30, 1944 (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 18, Series A, Reel 4) (discussing criminal defense cases from the agricultural South). See generally The Legal Front, Some
Highlights of the Past Year, 1940 (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 18, Series A, Reel 4)
(surveying criminal defense cases).
58 See ZANGRANDO, supra note 45, at 17 (discussing
the NAACP's longstanding involvement with the problem of lynching).
55
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vestigation and referral to the proper authorities, as when the NAACP
convinced the attorney general of Florida to bring before a grand jury
a white landowner who had murdered a black sharecropper."
Such extreme incidents were few and far between, however. In
the more mundane cases, at best, the national office would write a letter to the appropriate government official, serving as a conduit between the complainant and the government. Thus, Marian Wynn
Perry of the national legal department asked the Secretary of the
United States Department of Agriculture about the proper officials to
whom complaints about the farm loan program should be directed. 0
When Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson replied that he
thought the farm loan program was being administered without discrimination, and that he was "reasonably sure that the instances...
where loans have not been granted resulted from the failure of the
applicants to meet the requirements for eligibility, ' 61 Perry did not
pursue the case further.
Slightly less proactive were the lawyers' decisions to treat the issues
as political rather than legal problems and to forward the complaints
to the political staff in the Washington Bureau. Clarence Mitchell, the
Washington Bureau's labor secretary, tried to give the case of the suc62
cessful cooperative farmers to Thurgood Marshall.
Marian Perry
passed it back to Mitchell, telling the complainant that Mitchell might
be able to help by contacting the FSA directly.61 Similarly, the legal
office sent the complaint about checks disappearing from rural post
offices to Washington to see if the post office could work it out. The
Washington Bureau wrote the Postmaster General to bring to his attention "certain difficulties [the Southern Tenant Farmers Union] has

59 Press Release, Franklin H. Williams, In the Case of Wyart Trueblood
(Mar. 10,

1947) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 9); Letter from Franklin H.
Williams to Attorney General of Florida (Jan. 30, 1947); see also ZANGRANDO, supra
note 45, at 28 (" [T] he Association was increasingly dissatisfied with merely responding
to mob murders as they occurred. Yet, it felt compelled to react to each new horror,
since it still lacked the means to launch any major campaign that might reasonably
forestall further lynching.").
6OLetter from Marian Wynn Perry, supra note 55; see also Memorandum
from Julia
E. Baxter to Clarence Marshall (June 11, 1947) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13,
Series C, Reel 2) (relaying an NAACP member's request "for information on the Federal crop program for 1947").
61 Letter from Clinton P. Anderson to Marian Wynn Perry
(July 15, 1947) (on file
with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
62 Memorandum from Mitchell to Marshall, supra note
56.
63 Letter from Marian Wynn Perry to Mrs. Augustus
Evans (July 23, 1947) (on file
with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
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encountered in securing the delivery of mail to their members in the
South .'64

Sometimes, as when the national office responded to Mrs. Texanne Thornton, complainants were referred to the branches or organizations like the Southern Tenant Farmers Union. Although the
national legal department showed some interest in a case where the
widow of a farmworker was denied his share of the crop allegedly because he had died in debt to the farmer, it saw branch involvement as
an impediment to its own." More commonly, those complaining of
property fights infringements were told, as Charley Bright was, that
"[t]he matter of your letter is a purely private one and does not come
within the rules of the Association. 67
Those rules, as the legal office stated so often in letters like the
one to Bright, allowed the Inc. Fund to take cases under only three
circumstances: where there was an injustice because of race or color,
where there was a denial of due process, or where there was a possibility of establishing
precedent that would benefit African Americans
•
68
substanially. Had the Inc. Fund seen the property cases as a systematic process of domination, it may have concluded that they fit some
interpretations of these "rules": the cases undeniably contained a racial component, they often involved a literal violation of due process
of law, and, considering the apparently widespread nature of agricultural property theft and fraud in the South, they might have led to
widely beneficial precedents. The lawyers in the national office, however, did not so interpret their rules. What they meant by racial injustice, as I will discuss below, was discrimination solely on the basis of
race; what they meant by precedential value was that it forwarded the

64

Letter from Leslie S. Perry to Hon. Robert N. Hannegan (June 17, 1946) (on

file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
65 See Letter from Clarence Marshall to Mrs. Texanne Thornton (Sept. 6, 1945)
(on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) (referring a claim to the Cairo
branch of the NAACP).
66 Letter from Edward R. Dudley to E.R. Avant (Nov. 2, 1944) (on file with NAACP
Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2); seealso id. ("I cannot promise whether we will be able
to assume responsibility in this matter since the case originated with our Branch in
Raleigh in the first place."). Such deference to the branch rarely characterized the
national office's approach in cases, like the boilermakers cases discussed infra at notes
173-175 and accompanying text, in which the national organization took a more acute
interest.
67 Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Charley Bright (Jan.
26, 1945) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) [hereinafter Letter from Marshall to Bright].
68 Letter from Thurgood Marshall to John Crawford (July 2,
1942) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 3) [Letter from Marshall to Crawford].
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lawyers' attack on Plessy; and what they meant by denial of due process
was the violation of constitutional rights in criminal proceedings. 69 As
a result, they saw cases like Charley Bright's as "purely private., 70 They
told people like Lettie Franklin that they "sincerely appreciate the
gravity of the situation in which you find yourself and regret that we
will be unable to give you any concrete assistance at this time., 7' The
best advice they could muster in many cases where the NAACP was
72
unable to help was to hire a private lawyer.
III. THE CEILING "WHIPPED THE SMALL NEGRO OWNER AND TENANT TO
DEATH": 73 COTTON WAGE CEILINGS AND MOBILITY
IN A "FREE" MARKET

The NAACP evinced somewhat more, though still quite minimal,
interest in the issues raised by the United States Department of Agriculture's imposition of wage ceilings on cotton picking right at the
end of World War II. While the property cases involved primarily
sharecroppers and tenant farmers, the wage ceiling issue not only affected those categories (as both were sometime wage laborers and
sometime employers) but also small landowners a step above and
wage laborers a step below. Moreover, in the property cases, the challenge was primarily against private power exercised by individual
property owners (backed, of course, by the knowledge that state
power would support them if challenged); in the case of wage ceilings,
the challenge was to the owners' harnessing of the power of the state
to interfere directly with the labor market. Because that interference
was aimed at leveling wages and preventing market mobility by cotton
workers, the wage ceiling issue concerned both workers' earnings as
well as their freedom of movement.
Under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, authority to
regulate the wages of agricultural workers was delegated to the Direc-

69 See infra Part V (discussing the Inc. Fund's interpretation
of "injustice because
of race").
70 Letter from Marshall to Bright, supra note 67; see also Letter
from Marshall to
Crawford, supra note 68 ("Such a case is a purely private matter.").
71 Letter from Robert L. Carter, Assistant Special Counsel,
to Mrs. Lettie Franklin,
Mt. Airy, N.C. (Oct. 30, 1945) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
72 See Letter from Marian Wynn Perry to KB. Brewer (Dec. 8, 1948) (on file

with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) (suggesting that a NAACP member of the
Charleston branch advise a family to contact private counsel since "there appears to be
nothing that this office can do to aid the Boyd family").
73Letter from Claude A. Barnett to Leslie Perry (May 20, 1946)
(on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) [hereinafter Letter from Barnett].
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tor of Economic Stabilization and the War Food Administrator during
reconversion.14 In August 1945, that authority was conferred on the
Secretary of Agriculture, Clinton P. Anderson.
In exercising his
authority, the secretary had to follow certain procedures. Local wage
boards, comprised mostly of white landowners, had to "hold a public
hearing for the purpose of determining whether a majority of the
producers of a commodity in ••a 76particular area participating in such
hearing" desired a wage ceiling. The boards were required to give
public notice "in prominent places in the area affected, and in news
stories or by paid advertisements in local newspapers of general circulation. 77 The recommendations of the wage boards were not binding
on the administrator, and the administrator was not to recommend a
ceiling "unless a majority of the producers of the commodity" requested it; even then, if the "majority is not representative of the entire group of producers of such commodity in the area affected the
wage board may withhold its recommendation" until the preferences
78
of the majority were clear.
In 1945, the Department of Labor held referenda in Mississippi,
Arkansas, and Missouri, and ceilings were set for the former two
7
states.
Complaints about the ceilings immediately reached the
NAACP not from the workers themselves, but from H.L. Mitchell of
the Southern Tenant Farmers Union and from Alfred Baker Lewis,
Secretary and Treasurer of the National Sharecroppers Fund and a
member of the NAACP's Board of Directors. Mitchell and Lewis were
up in arms.8 As Leslie Perry of the Washington office later put the

74

1947).

Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23
(repealed

Petition for Injunction at 1, Shackelford v. United States Dep't of Agric. (No.
H257) (E.D. Ark. 1945) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) [hereinafter Petition for Injunction, Shackelford v. USDA].
76 Id. at 3;see also id. (citing Exec. Order No. 9599,
3 C.F.R. 418 (1943-1948), and
setting out the full procedure for recommending the establishment of a wage ceiling).
Id.
78 Id.
79 Statement from H.L. Mitchell, President, Southern Tenant
Farmers Union, to
the Secretary of Agriculture (Sept. 10, 1945) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) [hereinafter Mitchell Statement] (noting that "[o]verwhelming votes
were cast in favor of such ceilings" in these states); see also Letter from H.L. Mitchell to
Leslie Perry (Dec. 7, 1945) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2)
[hereinafter Letter from Mitchell to Perry] (explaining why Missouri did not set a ceiling despite this vote).'
80 See infra text accompanying notes 114-28,
193-99 (discussing Lewis's commitment to the race and class components of the problem in contrast to his colleagues'
focus on the purely racial aspects of the situation).
75
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matter in a letter to Anderson, the farm lobby had succeeded in using
"the power of your Agency... to freeze the wages of this class of agricultural laborer at levels patently substandard.""' "[Niothing in the
national economy, or the economy of the cotton industry.., would
justify the drastic action that has been taken," she went on.8 2 The "action runs counter to the entire national wage policy" to enact minimum, not maximum wages."' Contrary to the federal government's
general movement toward improving the standard of living of workers, "[t]he ceiling and the way it operated," Claude Barnett of the Associated Negro Press
explained, "whipped the small Negro owner and
8 4
tenant to death."
The attack Mitchell and Lewis wanted to make on the ceilings had
multiple prongs. On the broadest level they argued that the secretary
generally lacked authority to impose cotton wage ceilings. The first
component of this argument was rather technical. They argued that
when the president modified wartime controls of prices, wages, materials, and facilities by executive order on August 21, 1945,8" the modification cancelled the USDA's
. 86 authority to set ceilings, and the ceilings were consequently illegal.
The second component of the lack-of-authority argument contended that the ceilings constituted an abuse of the authorizing legislation. The ceilings were meant to curb inflation by preventing wages
from rising so quickly that they would affect the economy generally.
817
But cotton workers were paid less than almost anyone in the country,
so there could be no inflation-related need to regulate cotton wages.
Indeed, inflation was not the target; the mobility of African American
day laborers, sharecroppers, and tenant farmers was the target.
Southern landlords had long ago figured out how to use first New
81

Letter from Leslie S. Perry to Hon. Clinton P. Anderson (Feb. 27, 1946) (on file

with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) [hereinafter Letter from Perry to Anderson].
82 Id.
83 Id.
84

Letter from Barnett, supra note 73.

85 Exec. Order No. 9599, 3 C.F.R. 418 (1943-1948).

If it was the case that only wage controls in industry had been eliminated,
Lewis
thought, "pressure could be brought to bear upon [President Truman] to remove
similar controls in agriculture." Letter from Alfred Baker Lewis to Walter White and
Thurgood Marshall (Oct. 15, 1945) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel
2) [hereinafter October Letter from Lewis to White].
87 See Mitchell Statement, supra note 79 ("[C]otton
pickers... [and] other agricultural labor in the cotton South ... enjoy the lowest wages of any workers in the nation.").
86
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Deal programs, and later wartime federal programs, to their advantage. One planter boasted that "he had been able to control the practice of truckers hauling pickers to the plantation paying highest rates
by virtue of being a member of the local [Office of Price Administration] rationing board ...and denying gasoline to truckers who failed
to follow orders." 88 Landlords who were members of the wage labor
boards thought wage ceilings could do the job more directly. The
"prime purpose" of the agriculture ceilings, then, was "to keep producers from pirating employees by offers of higher wages when work'
ers are scarce in a given area."89
So long as the market determined
price, laborers could move freely from one place to another in response to higher wages. Wage ceilings enabled the owners to ensure a
steady supply of wage labor without having to compete for it-ceilings
restrained the mobility of laborers to the benefit of their employers
and landlords. 90
Mitchell and Lewis also made a series of arguments that the ceilings were illegal due to infirmities in the procedures by which they
were put in place. First, they claimed that the low voter turnout indicated that the wage boards had failed to publicize adequately in accordance with the regulations and that the vast majority of producers

88

Id.

89 Memorandum from Leslie Perry to Mr. Dudley, Mr. Hastie, and Mr. White (Oct.

11, 1945) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
90 See Press Release, National Farm Labor Union
(n.d.) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) ("Statements were made by planters that they wanted a
wage ceiling set so that Negro sharecroppers would not be tempted to move into town
where they could earn more money as wage hands on nearby farms working 100 days a
year in the chopping and picking seasons."). The National Farm Labor Union was the
successor to the Southern Tenant Farmers Union. Letter from Alfred Baker Lewis to
Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 2, 1946) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel
2) [hereinafter Letter from Lewis to Marshall]. Indeed, the Secretary of Agriculture,
without an, apparent awareness of the implications of his response, essentially agreed
with the landowners. He described how, prior to the wage ceilings, the "supply situation" was "characterized by spiraling wage rates, pirating of workers by employers, high
labor turnover and excessive loss of working time by employees going from place to
place seeking the highest wage rate frequently on the basis of mere rumor." Letter
from Clinton P. Anderson to Leslie Perry (Mar. 13, 1946) (on file with NAACP Papers,
Part 13, Series C, Reel 2). The secretary was pleased that the institution of the ceilings
yielded a "more stable" situation, in which "pirating was minimized; wages tended to
become uniform ...[while w]orkers settled down to perform the specific task; and all
together more food and fibre was harvested and workers were afforded the opportunity of earning more total wages." Id. The secretary thus conceded that he was using
the wage ceilings not to curb inflation-which was the use for which they had been intended-but to restrict mobility.
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had "expressed their disapproval by not participating."!" Second,
Mitchell argued, an atmosphere of intimidation pervaded both the
hearings and the votes themselves. In Missouri, where the Southern
Tenant Farmers' Union (STFU) was able to organize opposition to
the ceilings, the wage board decided not to impose them. 92 In Mississippi, however, no cotton pickers testified, 3 and in Arkansas, "those
who represented the point of view of labor were subjected to insult
and intimidation.' 4 The voting proved problematic in a number of
ways. In more than one county in Arkansas, "a group of small farm
owners, tenants, and sharecroppers... having [been] notified of the
time and place to cast their ballots, waited throughout the day and no
one appeared to conduct the referendum."9' More generally, thought
Mitchell, the lack of a "provision in the regulations for a secret ballot"
allowed "plantation owners to herd their sharecroppers into the polls
and force them to vote as they saw fit."' 9 6 Many sharecroppers were intimidated into voting in favor of the referendum by landlords with
control over their livelihoods, their homes, and even, as the cases
above indicated, their lives.97
The third procedural challenge was potentially the most theoretically and doctrinally significant. Mitchell claimed that limiting voting
rights on the ceilings to "producers," and defining the term to exclude the wage workers who would be directly affected was unconstitutional. The referenda were "illegal because the people whose wages
are being set have no right to vote on the question. ' It was not entirely clear whether the problem lay in the legislation itself or in its interpretation by the wage boards and the secretary. Claude Barnett of
91 Petition for Injunction, Shackelford v.
USDA, supra note 75, at 4; see Mitchell
Statement, supra note 79 (observing that the vote in Arkansas was 9356 for a ceiling
and 2757 against, but the total number of farmers and farm operators in the counties
holding the referendum was 84,377, and thus less than one-seventh of the eligible voters had participated).
92 Letter from Mitchell to Perry, supra note
79.
93 Id.; Mitchell Statement, supra
note 79.
94 Mitchell Statement,
supra note 79.

95 Id.

96Statement from H.L. Mitchell to USDA State
Wage Stabilization Board Meeting,
Establishing a Wage Ceiling for Chopping Cotton (Mar. 6, 1946) (on file with NAACP
Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) [hereinafter Mitchell Statement to USDA].
97 See Mitchell Statement, supra note
79 (describing the Mississippi vote of 21,982
in favor and 315 against as akin to fascist votes); October Letter from Lewis to White,
supra note 86 ("[J]udging from the vote, either the wage workers were not included,
or else they were subjected to intimidation and/or misrepresentation as to what they
were voting on.").
98 Mitchell Statement to USDA,
supra note 96.
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the Associated Negro Press thought that "[w]hile these state committees are not directed specifically to receive the laborers point of view,
it is my understanding that they have assumed that to be a proper
function."' " Lewis agreed "that the 'producer[]' of a commidity obviously does not and legally should not exclude the wage workers in that
line."'00 Regardless of the origins of excluding the wage laborers, Leslie Perry concluded that a law that excludes them is "[n]ot only...
undemocratic in that it does not give the workmen a real voice in determining what he shall earn, but we think that it invades basic rights
guaranteed to him by our Constitution. " 'o1
Mitchell's final argument was a substantive one. He claimed that
it was "an absurdity for the Secretary of Agriculture to impose a ceiling
on wages of cotton pickers or any other agricultural labor in the cotton South since they enjoy the lowest wages of any workers in the nation.
Articles in the STFU's Farm Labor News emphasized the poverty of southern farm workers-their need for better housing,
education, health care-and showed that farm workers should earn
more than they did, not less. The STFU therefore "advanced a demand for a guaranteed annual wage of $625 per family for all farm labor.., based on the idea that no adult worker should earn less than
$5 per 10 hour day on the farm."'""
These arguments, in one form or another, all found their place in
a brief the STFU filed on behalf of the cotton farmers in federal court
in the Eastern District of Arkansas. 1 4 Unfortunately for the workers,
the brief was under-researched, poorly written, and lacking both solid
supporting facts and much legal analysis. The lawyer, as Lewis put it
in his efforts to get the NAACP's legal department involved, though
"thoroughly in sympathy" with the STFU, "may not be competent to
handle the constitutional question which may be involved.', 0 5 In fact,
despite the substantial rights claims nascent in the various arguments-involving the meaning of "producing" wealth, a minimum
wage for human survival, the right to earn a livelihood as a market actor in an allegedly free market economy, and the right to vote (less as

Letter from Barnett, supra note 73.
too Letter from Lewis to White, supra note 86.
101Letter from Perry to Anderson, supra note 81.
102 Mitchell Statement, supra note 79.

99

103
104

Id.
Petition for Injunction, Shackelford v. USDA, supra note 76.
from Alfred Baker Lewis to Walter White (Oct. 23, 1945) (on file with

105 Letter

NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
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a matter of racial equality than as a matter of class equality)-Lewis
conceded that the brief was "probably puerile and futile.' ', 0 In response, the United States moved to dismiss the case on no less than
five separate grounds, including failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. 07 The district court did in fact dismiss, but on
a much narrower and more easily surmountable ground: the Secretary of Agriculture was a necessary party to the action and service
could not be had against him in the district in which the plaintiffs had

chosen to initiate suit.'0 8 The farmworkers could thus gain another
chance to develop their arguments by filing suit against the secretary
in Washington, D.C.
Throughout 1945 and 1946, Lewis and Mitchell tried to get the
NAACP to take ownership of the case. Lewis wrote that it seemed to

him "that the N.A.A.C.P. ought to be in on it as nearly on the ground
floor as possible especially since we have more in resources, legal ability, and ability to reach the daily papers than has the STFU."'09 Involvement initially looked promising, as Lewis had obtained the following resolution:
The National Board of the N.A.A.C.P. opposes setting wage ceilings
for cotton picking, by a vigorous campaign of publicity, by enlisting the
aid of organized labor where possible, and by political pressure on the
Secretary of Agriculture and on the President; and we instruct the Legal
Department to explore possible avenues of legal attack on such wage
ceilings.10

Within the Inc. Fund's taxonomy of case significance-measured
as local, state, or national-the wage ceilings fell somewhere between
state and national,' a position that seemed to call for action. Moreover, if not univalent, the fact that "[n]early all [affected were] Negroes""' pointed toward the salience of race. At least on the level of

106
107

Letter from Lewis to Marshall, supra note 90.
Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Shackelford v. United States Dep't of Agric.

(E.D. Ark. 1945) (No. H-257) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
108 Letter from Mitchell to Perry, supra note 79.
109Letter from Alfred Baker Lewis to Walter White (Nov. 1, 1945) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
110 Minutes of the October NAACP Board of Directors Meeting (Oct. 17, 1945)
(on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
I See id. (pointing out how nineteen counties in Mississippi had ceilings
and how
the movement was spreading).
112 Mitchell Statement to USDA, supra note 96.
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rhetorical commitment,
the NAACP professed that it was "deeply in113
terested" in the issue.
But from relatively early on, the prospects for aggressive and substantial NAACP action looked poor. Lewis had a hard time getting either the political or the legal staff actually to act. "Because of the
complexity of the problem involved and our work on other cases at
the moment," the legal department told the STFU that it could not
support the initial lawsuit.' 4 In fact, the legal department decided not
only that the STFU's brief was not "adequate enough to challenge the
position of the agricultural department in this matter ' "5 but also, on
the basis of that "inadequate" brief and little additional research, that
the case had no merit."' Instead of legal action, Thurgood Marshall
suggested that Leslie Perry of the Washington office put political pressure on the USDA. " 7 But Perry told a skeptical Lewis that he should
wait for the outcome of the STFU's legal case before lobbying the secretary. " " Even when Walter White told Perry to follow up on Lewis's
suggestion that the NAACP involve the unions, which might argue "in
opposition to the principle of setting wage ceilings under the circumstances provided by the law which do not give any effective opportunity to the workers concerned to be heard,"" 9 the Advisory Committee

113
114

Letter from Perry to Anderson, supranote 81.
Letter from Edward R. Dudley, Assistant Special Counsel, NAACP, to H.L.

Mitchell, President, Southern Tenant Farmers Union (Oct. 30, 1945) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
115 Letter from Edward R. Dudley, Assistant Special Counsel, to Alfred Baker Lewis
(Oct. 30, 1945) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
116 Letter from Edward R. Dudley, Assistant Special Counsel, NAACP, to Leslie
Perry, Administrative Assistant, NAACP Washington Bureau (Oct. 26, 1945) (on file
with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2). The latter conclusion grew out of an
exceedingly narrow conception of the possible arguments that could be presented.
Edward Dudley limited himself to the technical question of whether the secretary's
authority had expired. He concluded:
It seems to me that if the existing war time legislation granting to the President the power to promulgate certain laws and regulations designed to check
prices, etc. have not terminated either by act of Congress or Presidential order, that these controls might very well be held constitutional at this time as
necessary legislation to control reconversion, particularly in view of the fact
that Congress has not officially declared the end to the war.
Id.
17 Memorandum from Thurgood Marshall to Leslie
Perry (Jan. 3, 1946) (on file
with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
118 Letter from Leslie Perry to Alfred Baker Lewis (Nov. 30, 1945) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
119 Letter from Alfred Baker Lewis to Leslie Perry (Mar. 22, 1946) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
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of the Washington Bureau still refused to take responsibility.1" Seeing
no need for its own lobbying activities, the committee recommended
studying the possibilities for a lawsuit.121
Lewis kept pushing, reminding Walter White that the board of directors had resolved to act and that nothing much had been done. 22
He tried to convince the Inc. Fund that it could shape the case itself,
in any direction. Lewis believed if the Inc. Fund would
attack the problem from the point of view of bringing the proper suit or
having the proper suit brought rather than from the point of view of ap-

proving or disapproving the legal efforts of the STFU, that organization
will agree to any suggestion or proposal
that you are likely to make for
2
3
legal action in some other form.'

He emphasized that the Inc. Fund could get involved "not necessarily
through support of the STFU but as an amicus curiae or through a
suit of our own which would be1 consolidated
with the hearing of the
24
other suit before a higher court.
In the end, the steps the NAACP took were far less substantial

than submitting an amicus brief. Marian Wynn Perry of the legal department told a new attorney hired by the STFU, with the help of the
Workers Defense League, to keep her apprised of its plans so that the
Inc. Fund could "take supporting action. 12 5 But as it was too late for
legal action to affect the 1945 season, and the ceilings expired before
the 1946 season, none was ever taken. Marian Perry also reached out
to the Chief Attorney of the Regional War Labor Board, Tom
O'Brien, who told her that he "could see no reason why wage controls
in agriculture should continue as stringent as ever when wage controls

120See Memorandum from Leslie Perry to Walter White (Apr. 17,
1946) (on file
with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) (basing its decision not to pursue the
case on the "enormous pressure now being brought by the large bloc of cotton state
representatives," "the apparent legality of the Department's action," and the lack of
"information ...indicating local (community) suffering or indignation on account of
the imposition of ceilings").
121 Id.
122See Letter from Alfred Baker Lewis to Walter White (Dec.
27, 1945) (on file
with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) (stressing the importance of combating
wage ceilings and dismissing any possible reasons for the NAACP's "hesitation or delay").
123 Letter from Lewis to Marshall, supra note 90.
Letter from Alfred Baker Lewis to Walter White (Nov. 1, 1945)
(on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2) [hereinafter November Letter from Lewis to
White].
125Letter from Marian Wynn Perry, Assistant Special Counsel, to Joseph
Freeland
(Jan. 2, 1946) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
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in industry had been lifted. 12 Leslie Perry wrote a single letter to
127
Clinton Anderson, the Secretary of Agriculture.
These three actions-two government contacts and the possibility of "supporting action" in a lawsuit that never materialized-constituted the sum total of
NAACP involvement. Lewis "confess[ed] defeat by the invincible inertia of the National Office in my attempt to get them to follow out the
Board's specific instructions and take some action in opposition to the
wage ceilings." 28 The grudging steps the office had taken compared
poorly with the vast legal and political campaign to protect the livelihood and mobility of black agricultural workers Lewis had had in
mind.
V. "THE APPEARANCE OF FREEDOM BUT CERTAINLY NOT THE
REALITY":, 2' PEONAGE, INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE,
AND DIRECT CONTROLS ON MOBILITY

Personal mobility was even more directly threatened in the final
set of cases that leaps out from the archives-those involving involuntary servitude. Where employers hoped to obtain labor and property
with minimal expenditure in the property cases and to curtail mobility
by making it less profitable for farmworkers to move in the wage ceiling case, the white employer's desire in involuntary servitude cases was
to obtain costless, or nearly costless, labor through the complete
elimination of the worker's mobility. In response, African Americans
throughout the South (and a few elsewhere) complained to the
NAACP about "violat[ions] under the Federal Civil Rights
statute and
30
under the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution.'
While some of the complaints did not specify what their victims
meant by "peonage," "involuntary servitude," or "slavery" but simply
asserted the condition and the need for help,' 3' others challenged

126 Memorandum from Marian Wynn Perry to Thurgood
Marshall (Jan. 7, 1946)
(on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
127 Letter from Perry to Anderson, supra note 81.
128 Letter from Alfred Baker Lewis to Leslie Perry (May 28, 1946) (on file with

NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
129 Letter from Milton R. Konvitz, Assistant Special Counsel, to Leslie Perry,
NAACP Washington Bureau (July 8, 1943) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series
C, Reel 12) [hereinafter Letter from Konvitz].
130Letter from Harold D. Snell to Luther M. Swygert, Assistant United States Attorney, Hammond, Ind. (Sept. 11, 1947) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C,
Reel 12).
131 See Letter from Mrs. Erma.J. Jenkins to NACCP [sic] (Nov. 26, 1946) (on file
with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12) ("1 have been informed that you could
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specific mechanisms of force and coercion or focused on what they
deemed the essential characteristics of slavery-like employment. Many
of the complaints concerned "peonage" proper, where a laborer was
forced to work for a particular employer to repay a debt to that employer. The debt itself could arise in any number of ways. Sometimes
wage laborers complained that they had to pay their employers exorbitant 132
prices for travel, food, or shelter that their wages were unable to
cover.
One letter reported a large farm on which the owner held
fifteen or twenty African Americans, paying them a very small amount,
charging them excessively at his own commissary, and working them
"long, hard hours."'133 Often, even though peonage was not only contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment in some abstract sense but also
subject to criminal penalties actually imposed by the federal government since the early twentieth century, 31 4 employers made little effort
to hide their intent. Thus one employer wrote to the sister of a man
he was holding, "[Your brother] is in my debt. He owes me $75.00.
He cannot leave this island until I receive my money.,115
Others complained that they were the victims of trumped-up
criminal charges. In one common scenario, the employer would pay
the employee's fine and then require the worker to work off the debt

abide me in relieving my Daughter from almost slavery which she has been for seven
years.").
132 See Press Release, NAACP, [entitled] Department of
Justice (Nov. 4, 1942) (on
file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12) (discussing peonage at the United
States Sugar Corporation, which forced workers to pay off transportation and other
debts).
1 Letter from C.B. McCullar to Roger Baldwin (May 19,
1941) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
See, e.g., United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 528-29 (1944) (holding the
defendant liable under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000), and finding that "placing a person in...
a condition of peonage was one of the evils to be suppressed" by the statute); United
States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 144, 150 (1914) (finding a system enabling private
employers to pay fines and court costs of defendants who pled guilty and then requiring the defendants to work off their debt to the employers under threat of rearrest violative of the Thirteenth Amendment and other federal statutes).
See generally,
Goluboff, supra note 5, at 1638-39 (discussing the Peonage Act of 1867, Act of Mar. 2,
1867, ch. 187, § 1, 14 Stat. 546 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2000)), and
its enforcement).
135 Letter from William Lucas to Sister of Charlie
Stubbs (Mar. 21, 1943) (on file
with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12); see also Letter from Officer Edward L.
Nixon, Chicago Police Dept., to Steven B. McCord, Chicago (n.d.) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12) (complaining that Nixon's brother had
been accused of a debt and threatened with murder on a plantation and that his wife
was still held there in a "modern slave system").
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in his employ. 36 Arthur Shores, a black attorney and prominent
member of the NAACP in Birmingham, Alabama, described another
scenario involving manipulation of the criminal justice system:
It seems to be a common thing now since farm labor is so scarce to
trump up any sought of a charge in order to put Negroes in jail in the
farming areas then let them out without finally settling their cases, and if
they leave these farming districts, have them returned
on the pretext
37
that they are either fugitives or probation violators.

One merchant who helped a parolee procure ajob found out the
power of such schemes a little too late. He reported, "Well changing
jobs is not considered a felony anywhere in America so I took [the]
threat [of rearrest] lightly, but sure enough a deputy Sheriff came and
returned Pope to Parchman [prison], and there he is now.",3 s Milton
Konvitz recognized the paradox of the parole cases when he stated:
The person is not working off a debt or a fine. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment, and given a parole on condition of his working on a
farm. The involuntary servitude comes in only with respect to the absence of a choice of employment, and also with the fact that the parole,
conditioned as it was, gave him only the appearance of freedom but cer13T
tainly not the reality.

During the war another legal weapon was added to the planters'
arsenal. Numerous municipalities passed, and many others enforced
informally, so-called "work or fight" laws, in which "police officers... 40
form[ed] a 'Gestapo' to force local Negroes to the cotton fields."
Both those with and those without jobs were treated as vagrants and
forced to work in agriculture; they could be, and frequently were,
jailed for refusing to do so. The NAACP had

136

See Letter from Rev. Aron S. Gilmartin, Chairman, National Executive Board,

Workers Defense League, to Walter White (June 22, 1944) (on file with NAACP Papers, Group II, Box A468, Folder in General Office File, Peonage General 1941-1955)
(telling of eighteen African American women in Oakland Park and twenty-four men in
Fort Lauderdale who were arrested for protesting their low wages and then released
into the debt of their employers); see also Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 133, 139-40 (describing
the cases of Ed Rivers and E.W. Fields who were fined $43.75 and $69.70, respectively,
and then forced into involuntary servitude).
137 Letter from Arthur D. Shores to Thurgood
Marshall (Feb. 24, 1943) (on file
with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
138 Letter from W.J. Lacy, Merchant and Planter,
Lyon, Miss., to William Henry
Huff (n.d.) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
139 Letter from Konvitz,
supra note 129.
140 Letter from A. Maceo Smith, Secretary, NAACP, to
Thurgood Marshall, Special
Counsel, NAACP (Nov. 7,1945) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C,Reel
12).
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information that large farmers and county police officials, in an effort to
stop Negro farm workers from leaving the area for more lucrative employment in industrial centers, have resorted to placing them under arrest on spurious charges and when unable to pay fines requiring [them
to] ...work on local plantations.141
Others complained that they were kept in particular jobs through
violence, force, or intimidation exercised by the landowner directly on
the employee without the mediation of either an alleged debt or a
criminal proceeding. One woman wrote for help getting her aunt and
uncle
from some old white farmer out from Maco Miss thay got the children
tied to the Bed lef and whip them ... oh thay are under slavery please
Do some thing for them ...we are afraid to
42 go at there . .. thay are
liveing in the yard with the old white people.1
Still other workers complained of being beaten with cat-o-nine tails or
hoses. 14 For some, the immobility that accompanied such treatment
was so severe that they perceived themselves to "belong" to their em144
ployers.
Finally, some complaints about peonage, slavery, or involuntary
servitude focused less on the legal means by which employers kept
employees immobilized and more on the conditions in which the employees worked and lived. Some letters in this category, like most in
the other categories, concerned male agricultural workers.
Lucy
Graves in Poughkeepsie, New York, for example, told the NAACP
about "Negroes who had been imported from Florida [and] were
working in terrible conditions," a "serious situation which is illegal in
the state.""' Other complaints, however, especially in.the later 1940s,
came from female domestic workers like Elizabeth Coker.1 4 6 Coker
and those who came into contact with her described the "actual slav141

Press Release, NAACP, NAACP UrgesJustice Dept. to Investigate Peonage (May

28, 1943) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12); see
also Maryland "Peonage" Studied, HE-ALD TRIB., Sept. 27, 1943 (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12) (discussing Maryland's "work or fight" law).
142 Letter from Willie May Washington, Hattiesburg, Miss., to the
NAACP (May 12,
1941) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
143 Letter from George Tailor to "Gentlemen"
(Aug. 29, 1941) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
144 Frank McCallister, Report on Peonage at Sealy Springs
2 (Jan. 15, 1942) (on
file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
145Letter from Lucy Graves to Thurgood Maishall (Aug. 9, 1940)
(on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12) [hereinafter Letter from Graves].
146See generally Goluboftf supra note 5, at 1663 ("The women emphasized
lack of
pay, degrading conditions, and hard work.").
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ery" in which she lived, working long hours at labor thought inappropriate for a nineteen-year-old woman for little or no pay, forced to
sleep in a chicken coop without a bathroom, and lacking access to
education, church, or visitors. As she put it, "In all the time I was in
the Franklin home I never enjoyed any privileges of a free person.""'
PollyJohnson's situation was similar. One observer wrote:
[S]ome white folks raised [her] as a slave without the knowledge of her
age and no schooling and her hands look like they have been cracked
open with corns and callouses from hard labor and she says that she has
been whipped with lashes and treated real cruel and slept in a chicken
house and rain on her bed, and in fact the
way the girl acts, she has been
148
treated even worse than she can explain.

In these accounts, the employers certainly used physical violence,
but the oppressive nature of the working and living conditions served
as the basis for many of the complaints.
Few in or in contact with the NAACP seemed to doubt how widespread or deep-seeded these practices were in the 1940s South.14 ' One
branch saw the phenomenon as "a revival of the old fugitive slave act"
and thought "that the policy of the government to freeze agricultural
labor in the South will permit unscrupulous whites to enslave Negro
labor on the pretense of carrying out regulations of the non-migratory
labor on farms." 15 0 Reports from various organizations urging the
NAACP to join the fight against peonage and involuntary servitude

147

Affidavit of Elizabeth Coker, El Paso County, Tex. (Jan. 30, 1947) (on file with

NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
148 Letter from Miss Mattie Lomax, D.C., to NAACP (Mar. 10, 1946) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
149

The Guide to the relevant NAACP Papers collection gives a good sense of how

widespread and geographically diverse the complaints were. It lists complaints from
Georgia, New York, Texas, Arkansas, Virginia, and Florida, among other states. A
GUIDE TO THE MICROFILM EDITION OF PAPERS OF THE NAACP, PART 10: PEONAGE,
LABOR, AND THE NEW DEAL 1913-1939 (John H. Bracey, Jr. & August Meier eds., 1990);
see also Letter from Knott to Perry (Nov. 18, 1947) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13,
Series C, Reel 12) (discussing several "cases of slavery" and people "still in bondage");
Letter from Carolyn M. Davenport, Executive Secretary, Philadelphia branch, NAACP,
to Walter White (July 14, 1943) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12)
("Iwonder how many more cases like this exists in Virginia."); Confidential Memorandum on Alleged Peonage in Milledgeville, Georgia (July 9, 1942) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Milledgeville Memorandum] (communicating the widely held belief that
a member of the community was running a peonage farm).
150Letter from Mrs. Julius White, Executive Secretary, Houston branch, NAACP,
to Thurgood Marshall (May 25, 1943) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C,
Reel 12) [hereinafter Letter from Mrs. Julius White].
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The Workers De-

[pleonage conditions in our own country exist in many sections of the
Deep South where intimidation and often violence are used to keep
sharecroppers and day laborers in virtual slavery despite a Supreme
Court ruling of long standing that it is contrary to the Thirteenth
Amendment to exact forced labor because of actual or alleged debt.5 '

And when investigating a case for the NAACP in Milledgeville, Georgia, Frank McCallister found the peonage charges "are undoubtedly
52
true as they are against a great many landowners in Georgia.'
The NAACP responded to involuntary servitude cases more often
and with greater energy than either the property cases or the wage
ceiling fight. Certainly, the NAACP did not see peonage as merely a
"private" problem. Staff members noted how the individual incidents
about which the letters often complained were part of a larger assault
on the mobility of African American workers in the South as a group.
Wrote Leslie Perry, "The land owners are quite worried about the
wages they will have to pay and the amount of labor they will have at
their disposal. This seems to be the main reason why there is a growing antagonism against the [Negroes] ."'5 Clarence Mitchell referred
specifically to "restrictions of the free movement of labor in the
South," and to "Southern growers [who] fear that workers who leave
54
will not return."
The national office nonetheless relegated many involuntary servitude cases to the branches, 5 a responsibility the branches often had
good reasons for wanting to lay at the door of the national office. Before Thurgood Marshall even had the chance to suggest that Lucy
Graves of Poughkeepsie should refer a peonage matter to the state
authorities herself because "you are nearer to the situation than we
are here," 5 , she had written:

Statement from Workers Defense League to the United Nations
(Dec. 18,
1947) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
52 Milledgeville Memorandum, supra note 149.
151

53 Memorandum from Leslie S. Perry to Victor Rotnem (May 27,
1943) (on file

with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
154 Press Release, NAACP, Alien Workers Not Needed, Mitchell Tells Committee
(July 20, 1950) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
155 See, e.g., Letter from Frank D. Reeves, Legal Research Assistant, to Henry Flowers, Jr. (Aug. 13, 1941) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12) [hereinafter Letter from Reeves] (referring a letter to the local branch because the branch
would be better able to help).
156 Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Miss Lucy
Graves (Aug. 12, 1940) (on file
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Do not suggest that a branch of the NAACP up this way work, as the
branch is absolutely inactive, beside this group of people are not familiar
with the proper procedures for conducting such an investigation, nor do
most of them have the time, as you must know
something about the em17
1
ployment situation facing all Negroes here.
The Houston branch, trying to help a runaway from Arkansas,

suggested another reason why branches may not have been able to
address peonage cases adequately:

"We think this case should be

handled by the national office so that the necessary machinery for getting evidence from Arkansas concerning the number of persons still
practically enslaved on this same farm can be obtained."158
More commonly, the NAACP investigated the case enough to ensure its veracity, and then it recommended that the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice prosecute. 159 Highly publicized peonage cases in the early twentieth century and during World War II
brought by private parties other than the NAACP do not seem to have
inspired the Association to bring its own.160 As Justice Jackson explained in Pollock v. Williams, "Congress raised both a shield and a
sword against forced labor because of debt.'W' The sword consisted of
the criminal laws under which prosecutions could be brought against
individual perpetrators, and the shield was the defense to the use of
with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
157 Letter from Graves, supra note 145.
158 Letter from Mrs.Julius White, supra note 150.
159See Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Thomas H. Browne,
President, Phoenix
Branch (Aug. 11, 1941) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12) (referring a complainant to the local United States Attorney); Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Frank McCallister (June 5, 1941) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series
C, Reel 12) (calling upon Frank McCallister to do the "preliminary investigation prior
to referring [the matter] to the Department ofJustice").
160 See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 25 (1944) (finding that
two Florida
fraud statutes effectively caused Pollock to be in a state of peonage and therefore ruling them void); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 31 (1942) (holding "that the sections of
the Georgia Code upon which this conviction rests are repugnant to the Thirteenth
Amendment," and reversing the underlying conviction); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S.
219, 245 (1911) (invalidating an Alabama statute because it violated the Thirteenth
Amendment); see also, e.g., THE NAACP AND LABOR, 1940-1955 (John H. Bracey, Jr. &
August Meier eds., 1991) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C) ("There are a
large number of peonage complaints included .... Few of the complaints are well developed because peonage is a federal offense, and the NAACP only reported the complaints to the Justice Department instead of attempting to bring suits itself."); Letter
from Thurgood Marshall to Arthur Shores (Mar. 3, 1943) (on file with NAACP Papers,
Part 13, Series C, Reel 12) ("Please bear in mind that the Department of Justice and
the FBI are very anxious to prosecute all worthy peonage cases and it is up to us to
keep feeding them these cases.").
161322

U.S. at 8.
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peonage-facilitating laws. Rather than limiting itself to referring
criminal cases to the Department of Justice, then, the Inc. Fund also
could have brought civil suits against individual employers under the
Thirteenth Amendment, defended victims of labor-fraud statutes, and
challenged the various statutes that legalized and facilitated the holding of African Americans in involuntary servitude.
For the most part, the possibility of private litigation does not
seem to have occurred to the Inc. Fund, even under the most obvious
circumstances. In one case Marian Wynn Perry described as "present[ing] a situation about as close to peonage as one can get," she
wondered "whether there is any action that can be taken?" 62 She decided, "It certainly would not be legal action but perhaps an investigation and some publicity might help these poor souls.' 63 In another
case, investigated by Frank McCallister of the Workers Defense League
for the NAACP, McCallister wrote Marshall that although "it is widely
believed in the community that Negroes who work for [the alleged
perpetrator] find it very difficult to get away from his place once they
agree to work there[,] ... there is no actual evidence of peonage
which would warrant Federal prosecution."" Even though one victim
was being prosecuted under the very "cheating and swindling" labor
contract law the Supreme Court would strike down in the shield case
of Taylor v. Georgia shortly thereafter, 6 5 neither McCallister nor Marshall saw any role in the case for Inc. Fund private initiative.'6"
162 Letter

from Marian Wynn Perry to Roy Wilkins (May 12, 1947) (on file with

NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
163
Id.
164 Milledgeville Memorandum, supra note 149.
65,
315 U.S. at 26.
166 Milledgeville Memorandum, supra note 149. McCallister
even explicitly stated
that since the Department of Justice had become more vigorous in its prosecution of
peonage cases, less work was required for the private organizations. "Under different
circumstances I would have done a more thorough [investigation] but with Mr. Biddie's announced policy on peonage you should have no trouble getting them in on the
basis of this [report]." Letter from Frank McCallister to Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 15,
1942) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
The NAACP, International Labor Defense, and other groups found the Department ofjustice initially unresponsive, and their letters frequently complained that the
Department was dragging its feet. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 50 (discussing
how NAACP Assistant Special Counsel Marian Wynn Perry would refer to the "'usual
brush-off from the Department," and observing that "the NAACP's legal staff was frustrated by its inability to secure action by the Department of Justice"); Letter from
Thurgood Marshall to Hon. Vito Marcantonio, President, International Labor Defense
(Mar. 9, 1942) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12) ("For quite
some time, we have repeatedly requested affirmative action by the United States Department ofJustice in this and other peonage cases."); Press Release, NAACP, ACLU,
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At other times, the possibility was known but left unpursued.
Thus the branch involved in the Elizabeth Coker case of the young
woman held by a family in "actual slavery" did contemplate bringing a
civil suit. Franklin Williams of the legal department told the branch:
Your procedure to date in retaining a private attorney to investigate and
report and to institute civil action is perfectly all right. Please ask Mr.
Faulk, however, to forward the affidavits and whatever other information
he obtains to this office so that we may send them to the Department of
Justice. I believe in this manner we can bring more pressure
to bear
67
into action. 1
upon them with a view towards spurring them

Once the case was referred to the government, it does not appear
the branch followed up on its plans for a civil suit. Thus, although the
Inc. Fund saw the importance of involuntary servitude cases and could
envision legal action regarding them, that action was not its own." '

Southern Committee for People's Rights, Workers' Defense League (n.d.) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
By 1941, Marshall could conclude that the Department was "moving swiftly on
these peonage cases throughout the south ....
[l]t is quite clear that they are really
beginning to move, and we should see some very good results in the near future." Letter from Thurgood Marshall to William Henry Huff (Dec. 16, 1941) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12); see also William H. Hastie & Thurgood Marshall, Negro Discriminationand the Need for FederalAction, LAW. GUILD REV., Nov. 1942, at
21, 23 ("The U.S. Department of Justice is maintaining a vigorous campaign against
peonage which has resulted in several successful prosecutions. There are many now
pending. The Department should be commended for this.").
167 Letter from Franklin Williams to White (Feb. 27,
1947) (on file with NAACP
Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
168 Rarely, the NAACP would attempt to do
some research into the legality of particular practices, as when Marian Wynn Perry wrote a law professor at the University of
North Carolina to ask whether it was an abuse of the parole system to release a prisoner to a sponsor and then keep him at work for the sponsor. Letter from Marian
Wynn Perry, Assistant Special Counsel, to Herman L. Taylor, Department of Law,
North Carolina College for Negroes (Sept. 17, 1946) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part
13, Series C, Reel 12). The evolution of the Civil Rights Section's own cases show the
possibilities for a more aggressive civil litigation program concerning peonage. As the
1940s progressed, the Civil Rights Section gradually expanded the kinds of cases it saw
as creating involuntary servitude. First it moved past the requirement that debt be involved, considering cases in which violence, force, or intimidation without the veneer
of contract kept people in servitude. Then it moved even further afield to attack the
laws that enabled southerners to limit the mobility of African Americans through various facially race-neutral laws. Finally, it began an attack on the conditions in which
some employers kept individual African American employees, suggesting that forcing
someone to live below certain minimal conditions violated the Thirteenth Amendment. See Goluboff, supra note 5, at 1654-68 (outlining the shifting contours of the
Civil Rights Section's attack on peonage).
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RIGHTS IN THE RACIALIZED POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
AGRICULTURAL SOUTH

In peonage and involuntary servitude cases, as in the property
cases and the wage ceiling issue, the Inc. Fund ultimately passed the
buck-if not to the individual's private means or the branch, then to
another organization, the Department ofJustice, or other government
agencies. It is not that the Inc. Fund did not care about these issues;
its periodic actions toward resolution, referral, or publicity show it
cared at least to some extent. Rather, it appears that these issues were
never on the table for the Inc. Fund's own developing litigation strategy. As NAACP lawyers contemplated their attack on racial inequality
in the 1940s, labor-related inequality as experienced by African
Americans working in southern agriculture stood outside their framework. The defining feature of that framework, as the Inc. Fund described it, was "injustice because of race."' The phrase itself is ambiguous, as it can mean either that race was the sole cause of the
injustice or one of a number of causes. To the Inc. Fund, however,
race discrimination was clearly univalent. Race was not a necessary
cause, not a sufficient cause, not a but-for cause: it was the only cause.
The kind of labor and employment cases the Inc. Fund took in
the 1940s shows precisely this exclusive definition of race discrimination. The three sets of cases in which the Inc. Fund became most involved were quite similar. The first, which it joined at a late stage in
the proceedings, concerned litigation brought by black railroad workers against white railroad unions. 70 In these cases, the union and the
employer signed a contract the effect of which was to eliminate African Americans as employees on the railroads. Before the Supreme
Court, the black workers argued successfully that the Railway Labor
Act's grant of exclusive representation to the bargaining agent selected by a majority of workers prohibited that agent from discriminating against a minority.' 7'
Second, and most vigorously, the Inc. Fund helped to bring suits
in similar cases involving union discrimination against shipyard workers in California, Oregon, and Rhode Island. African American work-
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See generally ERIC ARNESEN, BROTHERHOODS OF COLOR:
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171 Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen,
323 U.S. 210 (1944);
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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ers complained that their race was the only thing standing between
them and union membership and employment in the shipyards172
Because the boilermakers' union had obtained closed shop agreements with many shipyards during World War II-agreements that the
company would hire only workers who were members of the unionblack workers found themselves faced with a choice of joining segregated auxiliary locals that deprived them of virtually all the rights of
union membership or being fired from their jobs.173 As the brief for
the black boilermakers put it, "The only matter in which there is entire equality, without discrimination as between Negro and white
members is with reference to dues: the dues are equal."'174 The Inc.
Fund and the private lawyers with whom it worked succeeded in obtaining several state court decisions that required unions either to
grant the black workers equal rights within the union or allow them to
work without union membership, 175 though it eventually pursued legal
prohibitions on segregation itself in education rather than employ176
ment cases.
Finally, the Inc. Fund supported New York's pioneering law
against private discrimination in employment in two ways. First, it
filed amicus briefs in Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, in which the United
States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the New York
law as it applied to union discrimination. 77 Second, it brought administrative complaints of employer and union discrimination before the
172

173

Draft Brief (n.d.) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
The business agent for the auxiliary was appointed by a supervising white lodge

and had authority to assign men to jobs; the shop committee set up for handling grievances was appointed and controlled by the supervising white lodge; any upgrading of
black workers had to be approved by the white lodge; the auxiliary had no voice or
vote in the international conventions; and the auxiliaries and their members, but not
white lodges or their members, could be suspended arbitrarily by the international.
Press Release, NAACP, NAACP Aids Coast Shipyard Workers (Dec. 3, 1943) (on file
with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
174

Draft Brief, supra note 172.
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See, e.g.,
Williams v. Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 165 P.2d 903, 905 (Cal. 1946)

(finding the union's actions were "directed... against other workers solely on the basis of race and color" and were therefore illegal); James v. Marinship Corp., 155 P.2d
329, 342 (Cal. 1944) (upholding an injunction intended to "eliminate discrimination
on the basis of race and color alone").
176 See TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 116 ("Attacking the separate
but equal doctrine
of Plessy v. Ferguson in education was probably the center of the NAACP's efforts.");
MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION,
1925-1950, at 34 (1987)
(quoting Charles Hamilton Houston as saying,
"[e]conomically inferior education makes [Negroes] less able to stand competition
with whites for jobs" (alterations in original)).
177 326 U.S. 88, 93-96 (1945).
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New York State Committee Against Discrimination (SCAD).178
Though the complaints concerned tunnel workers and railroad workers, postal workers and others, and the challenges ranged from discrimination in hiring to differences in pay to separate facilities on the
job, each was similar in the univalence of race.
All of these cases-the railroad cases, the boilermakers cases, and
the SCAD complaints-concerned workers who, because they were
black, were denied privileges extended to white workers in the same
unions, the same jobs, the same companies, the same industries. In
each instance, African American workers were treated differently
from, and notably worse than, white workers solely because of their
179
race.
In contrast, the problems facing African American agricultural
workers in the South were intimately bound up with both their race
and class position. These workers were vulnerable because they were
poor, isolated, and without the political rights of the white majority.
They lived in a world of white economic domination and black economic dependence, of white political power and black disfranchisement, of the ubiquitous potential for legally unrestrained white violence and the almost certain swift retribution against black violence,
real or imagined. The combination of racial, economic, and political
oppression made black agricultural workers in the South vulnerable to
structural exploitation. ' °
In part, the complaints of these African American agricultural
workers seem somewhat surprising and anachronistic in the 1940s. By
that time, black southerners were more mobile, as evidenced by the
fact that approximately two million moved to cities across the country
during the decade. ' They were entering the military, the war industries, and the urban employment market in large numbers. But it is a
178

Reel 4).
179

E.g., Monthly Reports, 1946-1947 (onl file with NAACP Papers, Part 18, Series A,
Indeed, these workers suffered economic problems too. The basis for their

complaints was often the economic disadvantage that accompanied race discrimination and exclusion. But their complaints were treated as solely race based and the
problems they faced were generally redressable through race-specific measures.
80 See generally DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY, supra note 17,
at 21 ("The seeds
of peonage grew well in social and economic soil so fecund with opression."); MYRDAL,
sulfna note 35, at 77-78 (noting that there was no such thing as a "primary cause" for
the plight of black workers); ZANGRANDO, supra note 45, at 12 (coupling the decline in
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148 (1973).
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mistake for historians to follow the fortunes of only those who managed to leave. At the end of the 1940s, twenty-nine
percent of African
82
Americans still worked in southern agriculture.
Moreover, it is a mistake to equate regional differences with the
elimination or relaxation of the same racialized political economy that
had its roots in slavery. Mobility out of the South and mobility within
it could not be equated. In fact, the former led to even greater restrictions on the latter. In a time of perceived shortage of agricultural
labor-due to the war and migration to cities and the North-landowners resorted to varied methods of coercion and force to maintain
a cheap and captive labor force. One might think that a tighter labor
market would redound to the benefit of workers, who could, in a free
market, command higher wages. But southern agriculture, particularly for African Americans, bore only partial resemblance to a free
market. Landowners, with the help of local, state, and federal governments, resorted to extramarket mechanisms, from "work or fight"
programs to fabricated debts and charges, from outright force to degrading living and working conditions, from governmentadministered wage ceilings to appropriation of property that kept laborers from obtaining or exercising financial or geographical independence. 83
Observers often made the race/class connection explicit. Frank
Welch, for example, in his land tenure study, stated unequivocally,
"[It] cannot be too strongly emphasized that the plantation tenancy
system has racial and political as well as economic implications. It is
the partially accepted solution to a race problem that has existed since
the Civil War.'18 4 One undated cartoon from the 1940s showed an African American farmer plowing a field with a mule, as a whip held by a
white hand is about to strike his back. The heading read, "Slavery in
the United States, Peonage," and at the bottom of the picture were
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the words "Racial Economic Bondage.' 85
Nor were the race/class connections central to these problems
lost on some of those who encouraged the NAACP to act on behalf of
southern agricultural workers. Alfred Baker Lewis asserted that the
wage ceiling "situation is a rotten one from every point of view both
racial and economic."'8 s He repeatedly emphasized "that this is the
sort of case on economic, legal, and racial grounds we ought to support in every way we can.' ' 7 He explained the importance of such
cases when he stated, "those who suffer from the imposition of wage
ceilings are on the lowest rung of our economic ladder and are also
among those most completely denied political, economic, or social
8
rights of all of our citizens.""'
William Henry Huff, an African American lawyer and selfdescribed crusader against peonage, depicted the race/class interplay
in peonage in similar, if more contentious and less analytical, terms.
He stated that people in peonage
are under the bottom rail. They are, indeed, defenseless; no one wishes
to bother with them because, first, they have absolutely no money, and
second, they are at best a debased, ignorant and servile crew. But if we
sit idly by and allow the overlords to enslave all who are of their type, ere
long the same bell will toll for us in some manner.is0
He told the NAACP that he was on board with "equal pay for teachers"
and "all the other necessary reforms."'90 But he insisted that none
should come "at the expense [of] liberty for the peons, the people farthest down. " l"" He saw the antipeonage crusade not as separate from
or contrasted to other kinds of racial injustice but rather as "'a companion fight to the nation-wide struggle to pass the anti-Poll-tax and
anti-Lynching bills and the fight of John L. Lewis to lead the way to-

185 Clipping (Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York, New
York, Clipping File, 1925-1974, FSN 003,902-2, Frame 81).
186 October Letter from Lewis to White, sulra note 86.
187 November Letter from Lewis to White, supra note 124.
188 Letter from Alfred Baker Lewis to Marian Wynn Perry (Jan. 15, 1946) (on file

with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
189 Letter from William Henry Huff to Walter White (Nov. 24, 1941) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12).
190 Letter from William Henry Huff, Chief Counsel,
Abolish Peonage Committee
of America, to Thurgood Marshall (Dec. 21, 1941) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part
13, Series C, Reel 12).
191
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ward smashing the wage-differential."1 92 For Lewis and Huff, the very
interconnectedness of race and class made the agricultural cases urgent and significant.
The way in which most farmworker complaints wrapped together
multiple levels of oppression and multiple levels of rights demands
lent itself uncomfortably, if at all, to a framework of discrimination on
the basis of race alone. The Inc. Fund nonetheless sometimes tried to
transform the farmworkers' claims-based as they were at least in part
on race discrimination-into univalent claims of race discrimination
cognizable under its general framework. In response to one complaint letter in which the Association understood the complainant and
his wife to be "held on some white person's farm against [their] will,"
one NAACP lawyer replied: "We are sure that if you are suffering an
injustice because
of your race the branch will do whatever is possible to
93
help you.,,1

The Inc. Fund also suggested redressing peonage through means
more commensurate with its other legal activities and interests. The
organization received one complaint about a "young Negro child
whom it is alleged has been 'sold' to a white woman" in Florida.'94 After discussing the case with the Department of Justice and concluding
that there was no violation of the peonage statute proper (during a
time prior to the Department's more expansive use of the civil rights
statutes for Thirteenth Amendment protection), 5Thurgood Marshall
suggested the branch officer take the matter up with the Florida
authorities. Marshall was not convinced that any good would come of
such a complaint because Florida was so "uncivilized." In concluding
his letter to the branch, Marshall took the opportunity to shift the
ground to terrain on which he was more comfortable:
This is merely one more [in] a long line of cases which justify our continued action to secure the right to vote for Negroes in Southern states,
in order to compel the law-enforcement authorities in these states to give
Negroes the equal protection of the laws to which they are entled.196

192 Press Release, Abolish Peonage Committee of the
International Labor Defense,
Abolish Peonage Committee Hails U.S. Indictment of Georgia Peonage Land-Lord
(n.d.) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12) (quoting Huff).
193 Letter from Reeves, supra note 155
(emphasis added).
194 Letter from Thurgood Marshall to James
Hoy (Oct. 27, 1941) (on file with

NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 12) [hereinafter Letter from Marshall to Hoy].
195See Goluboff, supra note 5, at 1654-68 (describing the Department of
Justice
Civil Rights Section's "broadening" efforts in involuntary servitude prosecutions).
196 Letter from Marshall to Hoy, supra
note 194.
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Marshall thereby transformed a peonage complaint into an occasion for promoting voting rights.
Similarly, when Marian Wynn Perry became involved with migrant
farm workers in New York state in the late-1940s, the problem as she
saw it was not the deplorable conditions in which the migrants all
lived, but the fact that the African Americans were in segregated
camps whose conditions she thought were worse than the others.19 7 In
addition, when H.L. Mitchell of the National Farm Labor Union wrote
the NAACP asking the staff "to help protect the rights" of "Negro and
white farm workers" who were violently attacked while on strike,'"
Perry wrote back that "there would certainly appear to be some
grounds for intervention by the N.A.A.C.P. to protect these Negro
farm workers from violence and police brutality. " '" Perry thus racially
divided an interracial strike in order to take interest in African Americans alone.
These transformations of the multivalent race/class complaints of
agricultural workers into what the Inc. Fund considered race claims
were both haphazard and unsystematic. The reality was that the
farmworkers' claims could not be so reduced. The harms they faced
were not only many, they were connected and reinforcing. As a result,
it was unlikely that a litigation strategy whose sole goal was to wipe out
univalent race discrimination and segregation would get the farmworkers very far. Were they legally allowed to vote, they still would
have faced intimidation at the polls leveraged by economically powerful landlords. Were they legally able to attend white graduate schools,
they likely lacked the means to do so, borrowing as they often were for
seeds for the next season's planting. The same held true for the integrated neighborhoods of black and white homeowners that might
arise with the unenforceability of racially restrictive covenants. 2°° The
197 Report of the Legal Department for the Month
of July 1946 (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 18, Series A, Reel 4).
198 Letter from H.L. Mitchell, President, National Farm Labor Union, to Walter

White (July 3, 1946) (on file with NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
Letter from Marian Wynn Perry to H.L. Mitchell (July 10, 1946) (on file with
NAACP Papers, Part 13, Series C, Reel 2).
200 During the 1940s, the NAACP focused on litigation
challenging white primaries, segregated graduate schools, and racially restrictive residential covenants. See
TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 81-125 (describing in detail the underlying theories and
mechanisms of the NAACP's litigation strategy in the 1940s); MARK V. TUSI-INET, THE
NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987);
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integration of unions or employers would have provided little help in
the agricultural South. The only union around, the STFU, was already integrated; the workers' problems lay rather in the seemingly
overwhelming difficulties the union faced in challenging the political
and economic power of the planters. Even if their employers treated
them the same as white tenants, sharecroppers, or wage hands with
regard to the terms of employment, vast improvements were unlikely.
The employer who was also landlord and banker had ways other than
racially differentiated wage structures for maintaining dominance.
Thus, not only were the kinds of claims the farmworkers raised
repudiated by the Inc. Fund, but the kinds of claims that did fit the
Inc. Fund's agenda offered only partial solutions to the farmworkers
and their interconnected problems. The Inc. Fund aimed to eliminate racial barriers, not to tackle the combined race and class concerns that arose in the agricultural South. For these workers, racial
barriers were only one part of a multifaceted problem. One worker
seeking help from the NAACP articulated it this way:
The negroes here most of them is afreaid of the white people here and

all of them is afreaid to go to the court house to vote, now take thing's to
a consideration, we live's in a free house such as it is, but you can't live in
the free house with nothing to eat one half of the time and no shoes and
cloth to wear in the winter.

CONCLUSION

This Article has shown how excavating the race/class complaints
that African American agricultural workers presented to the NAACP
in the 1940s changes the historiographical landscape of modern civil
rights. First, the farmworkers' multivalent race/class claims disrupt
the temporal and conceptual dichotomies that characterize the historiography. The 1940s might have marked more of a shift from class to
race for southern agricultural workers if they managed to leave the
agricultural South. 202 Those who stayed continued to live in an environment structured by interconnected racial and economic domination most amenable to challenge by multivalent rights claims. By including agricultural workers in our understanding of rights claimants,
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we see that the coexistence of race and class marked the rights claims
of at least some African Americans during the 1940s.
Second, the disappearance of these claims shows us the openness
of civil rights at the time. The Inc. Fund's attack on Plessy was the result of literally hundreds, if not thousands, of cumulative decisions
about how to shape a civil rights litigation strategy in the 1940s. Some
of those decisions, like the 1950 resolution to attack segregation head
on, are well known 0 3 But many others remain obscured. Before legal
strategies take such definitive shape, lawyers make choices to pursue
some cases and not others. The process begins with the claims individuals assert. It continues with those claims lawyers choose to recognize. And it crystallizes with how lawyers manipulate, translate, and
transform those claims through the legal process. Within this dynamic, each complaint the NAACP received was potentially the beginning of a legal proposition or strategy. The Inc. Fund's decisions
not to pursue the many cases from the agricultural South constituted
doctrinal, political, and institutional choices of the most basic and
fundamental kind.
Similar crucial but thus far unexplored choices-particularly to
take specific labor and employment cases and, ultimately, not to pursue labor cases at all-continued to mark the Inc. Fund's litigation
strategy in the 1940s. 0 4 Thus, seeing the Inc. Fund's choice to reject
the race/class claims of agricultural workers as a choice is only the beginning of a process of reshaping the historiography. So long as historians continue to identify a simple and binary "shift" from class
regulation to race-based rights during that decade, they remain captive to the Inc. Fund's success in transforming exclusively race-based
discrimination claims into legally recognized rights while leaving multivalent claims hidden in the NAACP's archives. Refusing to take the
prominence of univalent claims and the obscurity of multivalent
claims for granted is the first step toward a new historiographical
freedom and a better understanding of the significance of class in the
creation of modern civil rights.
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